Thursday, August 3, 2023

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The Case For Staying With Ethanol 10

Ethanol blending over 10 per cent may be desirable but a full understanding of its environmental and economic impacts is crucial.

Shyam Ponappa  August 3, 2023



Shyam Ponappa on ResearchGate

Comprehensive, Integrated Strategy & Execution
India has been coasting along on a post-feudal-colonial mélange of currents and tides, with the brigandage of opportunistic politics fed by our (the voters’) greed for short-term benefits. The result is grotesque populism and corruption, in lieu of the deferred gratification of pleasing cities and countryside with the appurtenances of proper governance: sidewalks and drains, toilets, transport, administration and order, hospitals and schools.

We have to organize and manage ourselves, “engineer” our way ahead, taking steps to build and develop our solutions, building systems and processes, and not just wait for things to happen. We need a comprehensive and integrated, systemic, silo-busting, problem-solving approach.

This applies across the board in the broadest “spatial planning” sense that integrates housing and land use at all levels with commercial, industrial, cultural, scientific and educational activity, transportation, and all governance and infrastructure: water, sewerage, energy, communications, basic health and education. Infrastructure being the first level of enablement is
 the essential starting point.


Previously, India’s leaders acknowledged that infrastructure is India’s great need. Yet, they took no steps [exception: NTP-2011 in October, 2011] to marshal forces to draw up a credible strategy and execution plan. This is what needed and needs doing. Only good intentions and/or money won’t do, because delivery systems and processes have to be developed, i.e., planned, and built from scratch.

It looks like the NDA II will seriously address the development of enabling infrastructure.  A beginning on a long way ahead.  The next few months will demonstrate the resolve of the NDA II to really break the mould and get the job done.

- July 2014

And it got worse for Digital India with another spectrum auction [March 2015] and the attendant deprivation of network rollout and service delivery. 

...And worse: another auction with Rs. 109,000 crore (~$17.6 billion). - April 2015

... And yet worse, as another auction reduced investment by over Rs. 65,000  crore  (~$10 billion). - October 2016

... And annual auctions threatened from 2017! - March 2017

Lack of integrated systems and controls led to the worst bank fraud in India - PNB $2 billion - February 2018  And IL&FS - September 2018

The National Digital Communications Policy 2018 is only an aspirational statement - October 4, 2018

Big bang for Wi-Fi!  5 GHz regulations similar to the US FCC. - October 2018

As the sector stalls, government talks 5G spectrum auction, wanting more cash while the industry drowns in debt. - January 2021  

The Supreme Court reverses previous rulings in favour of telecom operators on retroactive charges for spectrum based on an all-inclusive definition of Adjusted Gross Revenues continues...

Another ill-advised auction - March 2021.  And another monumental failure, neither serving the government's cash needs (too much left on the table), nor the consumers (too much spectrum left untouched).

A reversal (FINALLY!) of the retroactive tax amendment affecting Vodafone, Cairn, and others - August 5, 2021.

Spectrum Usage Charge zeroed; past due demands being reconsidered? - October 7, 2021

5G Spectrum Auction July 2022 nets Rs. 1.5 lakh crore (about $19 billion), making that amount of capital unavailable for investment in networks.  Allocation of an even larger amount to reviving BSNL and MTNL increases uncertainty of outcomes.



The Case For Staying With Ethanol 10

Ethanol blending over 10 per cent may be desirable but a full understanding of its environmental and economic impacts is crucial.

Shyam Ponappa Aug 03 2023 

India’s biofuel initiatives have been successful in getting us to a 10 per cent ethanol blend with petrol (E10). At this level, petrol engines sold in India since 2008 are not harmed, although older engines need modifications or no ethanol. Also, molasses as feedstock for ethanol from sugar factories have been adequate, supplemented by grain in good years, while the effluents are manageable, and there is less risk of “phase separation”, where a water-ethanol mix separates from the fuel. However, increasing ethanol to 20 per cent (E20) by the target date of 2025 is likely to be too disruptive. 

Food Stocks For Ethanol Production

To begin with, food stocks needed to produce ethanol are lower than expected. In keeping with the planned Food Corporation of India (FCI) rice supply for ethanol, stocks were provided at Rs 2,000 per quintal to ethanol producers, but states could not buy FCI rice in June, even at Rs 3,400 per quintal.  This is unsustainable and contrary to FCI’s purpose of providing foodgrains at stable prices. Press reports indicate FCI stopped rice supplies for ethanol in the third week of July, although the official position was unclear.1 By then, ethanol production from rice had already reached the target for the year, although producers reportedly expect to manufacture 970 million litres more, from 2.2 million tonnes of FCI rice.

The initial plan was that surplus rice from FCI would enable an increase in ethanol production from 2023 to 2025.  Instead, erratic weather has led to uncertain crop yields. India, which accounts for 40 per cent of the international rice trade, has banned non-basmati rice exports, roiling global markets. Also, continuing disruption of grain supplies from Ukraine has resulted in shortages and rising global cereal prices. Suppliers from Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia are also holding back.

The planned increase in FCI rice provision for ethanol is shown in the table (from Table 7.3 in NITI Aayog’s plan, converted at 450 litres of ethanol yield per million tonnes of rice). This is unsustainable, and warrants urgent review of planned rice supply and blend levels to set realistic goals.
If sustainable cellulosic ethanol production becomes a reality, avoiding the diversion of food crops, larger ethanol targets deserve consideration. Meanwhile, production at scale from non-food and non-sugarcane cellulosic feedstock has proved to be elusive for decades. It remains to be seen if commercial scale plants now operating in Italy and India, and being set up in America, can change that. 


As long as we are dependent on sugarcane and foodgrains for ethanol, there are compelling reasons to reduce targets. More land will need to be cultivated, requiring much more water, and extensive developments in logistics, like special materials for pipelines and tanks will be needed to deploy and use corrosive E20. The large stock of petrol vehicles will require engine modifications. To put it in perspective, the United States, which produces the most ethanol in the world (15,400 billion gallons) mostly uses E10, and has only about 3,300 E20 filling stations out of 145,000 countrywide (about 2 per cent).


Challenges


 * The government’s plan recognises feedstock availability as the first challenge for ethanol blended fuel. However, while the plan mentions the desirability of second generation feedstock from non-food sources such as cellulose, the period was shortened by five years, to 2025. 


* The second challenge mentioned was building extensive infrastructure to deal with logistics: Storage, transportation, and distribution of ethanol from the three states that produce it, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Karnataka, to the rest of the country. 


 * The third challenge is modifying existing petrol engines to use E20. The estimated petrol vehicles stock in India is 212.7 million as of March 31, 2023, of which two-wheelers comprised 176.2 million, three-wheelers 21.8 million, and four-wheelers 14.7 million. The modifications mean significant costs, and would need many skilled technicians. It will probably take years, creating considerable disruption in the economy. 


 * Although not mentioned, higher ethanol production means more effluents that need mitigation.  Vinasse is an organic waste of which 12 to 20 units are produced for each unit of ethanol from sugarcane.  Grain produces half as much. Its treatment before disposal or use continues to be a complex struggle.


Pros & Cons


The gains, according to some experts, are offset by the costs, such as low net benefits from reduction in greenhouse gases, the potential of damage to the environment, and costs to consumers.  Some scholars point out that greenhouse gases will be reduced only by 5 per cent by 2025 if targets are achieved, while emissions, such as aldehydes and ozone, will increase. Others suggest that land used for solar powered batteries would be much more efficient than growing crops for conversion to ethanol.2 A more technically sound assessment is needed.


While there is considerable momentum for corn-based ethanol in the US, and sugarcane-based ethanol in Brazil, these examples do not lend themselves to generalisation as universal solutions, because of the specific factors that enable their feasibility in their specific circumstances. 



Screenshot

There have been a number of compelling reasons put forward over the course of the last few years for targeting ethanol blending at 10 per cent and no more, and despite the attention, no OECD country uses E20 widely. The burden for less prosperous countries would be unimaginable, besides being impractical. 


The issue is whether on 

balance, the purpose of environmental and economic benefits is served.  From this perspective, ethanol blending over 10 per cent may be unjustifiable, because the environmental and economic impacts are mixed, including costs to consumers. Policymakers need to review the facts vis-à-vis assumptions and projections, to redefine objectives if required.  


Shyam Ponappa at gmail dot com