4G, 5G, or 6G - All Need Wireless Backhaul

A rose is a rose - or is there one that is sweeter?

Shyam Ponappa   |   December 2, 2021

Calling our networks 4G, 5G, or 6G makes little difference. What matters is service delivery to users. Once there is connectivity, the criteria for judging a network are speed, capacity, and latency (lag in response time). Our 4G experience is far short on these measures. Improvements are possible if our government proceeds on the basis of (a) objective assessment, and (b) concerted action on systematic, realistic, and phased plans and execution. The starting point is a factual assessment of our networks and service delivery compared with the rest of the world. The next steps are to frame policies and regulations to enable the better use of available resources for service delivery, without irrational hurdles.

An aspect of telecom not obvious to users is the reality of layered technologies that exist even in advanced environments. For instance, a country with excellent mobile services such as Norway has achieved among the fastest average speeds of over 50 Mbps with continued investment in 4G networks. 4G has evolved considerably and provides the core network, except for Standalone 5G networks. 4G has latency down to two-digit milliseconds, and speeds comparable to 5G in the lower user bands (below 6 GHz). High-frequency 5G provides faster user access on 4G platforms.

Realistically, we should plan for a mix of technologies going forward as 4G continues to evolve over the next decade. However, we need policies that result in full 4G coverage of good quality, not merely indulgent talk. Also, while 3G is being phased out because of its less efficient use of spectrum, it will take years to transition fully to 4G and beyond because of the cost and scale. In Europe, for example, even 2G is to continue until 2025 for certain applications.

What are the policies that can give us improved services? A good place to start is the Parliamentary Committee report tabled in February titled, “India’s Preparedness for 5G”.¹ Its main findings are that while 59 countries had deployed 5G, though largely on a limited scale, India had not done so. No 5G trials had been permitted as of January, and sufficient preparatory work had not been done. The challenges highlighted are:

• Inadequate spectrum, with only 50 MHz per operator, half the global average. For 4G, average spectrum per operator was even less, at a quarter of the global average.
• Exorbitant spectrum prices.
• Insufficient development of 5G use cases.
• Low fibre network availability.
• Deficient backhaul capacity.

The report emphasises the need for heavy investment to develop fibre networks, including for backhaul, and then deals with other aspects such as investments and local manufacturing.

Fibre does indeed provide the best connectivity. While highly desirable, it is the gold standard, and often prohibitively expensive. Fibre connections to towers are ordinarily justifiable only when financially viable. Second, small cells have to proliferate for 4G, 5G, and 6G, with wireless or fibre links (backhaul) to networks and Wi-Fi user access. The question is whether aiming for full or even substantial fibre connectivity to towers and small cells is realistic, compared with alternatives and technology trends.

Interestingly, the GSM Association published two reports addressing this in February 2021. The first was a study on backhaul in 40 countries titled, “Wireless Backhaul Evolution: Delivering next generation connectivity”.² The second was on the spectrum required for this titled, “Spectrum for Wireless Backhaul: GSMA Public Policy Position”.³

The first report indicates that 5G’s growing traffic and network capabilities will need massive augmentation of backhaul capacity through evolution. Wireless links are estimated to constitute 65 per cent of global backhaul links between 2021 and 2027, evolving to higher frequencies with wider channels, with regulators’ decisions helping or hindering specific 5G markets. The E-band (70-80 GHz) is expected to dominate wireless backhaul from 2021 to 2027. Many countries are also using V-band (60 GHz) delicensed for Wi-Fi. Even countries with high levels of fibre such as Japan and South Korea are using E and V bands for backhaul. Shouldn’t we do this, too? (See chart)

Chart: Full 4G + Some 5G with V-Band and E-Band

India has many urban and rural sites where fibre is infeasible, because of factors such as congestion, distance, terrain, dispersed users, and limited commercial potential. Wireless backhaul can fill in where fibre is not accessible or affordable, although evolution to higher, wider bands will be necessary. Meanwhile, wireless V and E bands are now reasonable alternatives for distances of about 1 km, and 3-4 km or more, with the disadvantage of rain attenuation. The GSMA report suggests this could be mitigated with carrier aggregation (combining) of E-band with lower bands (such as 15, 18 or 23 GHz) to provide 10 Gbps links for up to 10 km.

Active Network Sharing

Regulators worldwide are considering or pursuing the substantial benefits of active network sharing for enhanced coverage, reduced costs, and faster deployment. A McKinsey report in 2018 cited network sharing becoming a standard model for mobile operators, with a reduction in the total cost of ownership by 30 per cent, while improving network quality.⁴

Steps for Consideration

Formulate policies, laws and regulations for the following, with mandated spectrum/network sharing, paid for by reasonable revenue share (2-3 per cent) after a moratorium of 3-5 years (no auctions). Cap profits, and penalise diversion of revenues/profits.

1. Small cells: For Wi-Fi user access, V-band lower range and 6 GHz (using FCC model, as done for 5 GHz). Consider 12 GHz for Wi-Fi next.

2. Wireless backhaul, small cells/towers: V-band upper range and E-band, with light-licensed sharing among telcos for connecting to networks.

3. Private networks, small cells and backhaul: V-band light-licensed* for private networks, with public network connection through licensed telcos.

* After reconsideration December 4, 2021: "V-band allowed in private spaces for private networks and extensions, with public network connection through licensed telcos."

4. Active network sharing: Consider enabling or mandating active sharing of all elements of networks to speed up deployment, reduce clutter and radiation, and for efficient capital investment.

Orchestration and coordination across government departments and consultation with industry, as for NTP-99, to ensure better outcomes.

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Shyam (no space) Ponappa @ gmail dot com

1. https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/799780/1/17_Information_Technology_21.pdf

2. https://www.gsma.com/spectrum/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/wireless-backhaul-spectrum.pdf

3. https://www.gsma.com/spectrum/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/wireless-backhaul-spectrum-positions.pdf

4. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/technology-media-and-telecommunications/our-insights/network-sharing-and-5g-a-turning-point-for-lone-riders

Telecom Reforms: Relief - With Hope?

 

This could be a good first step towards a real transformation.

  Shyam Ponappa    |   October 7, 2021

At first glance, the big-bang telecom relief package last month might seem disappointing. A closer look shows the possibility of real promise. Could it be a subtle masterstroke, the first in a series of steps that will revive the sector? Here’s why.

• By not fully resolving the debt burden to result in sustainable cash flows, it gives the impression of a grudging debt-restructuring that doesn’t quite revive the patient, while prolonging the agony.
  
  
• However, it provides immediate relief with a four-year moratorium on cash outflows.
  
  
• An issue that defied resolution since 2003, of what constitutes revenues for sharing, has been defined rationally as revenues from telecom.
  
  
• The spectrum usage charge has been rescinded.
  
  
• Solutions for revival are to be worked out as next steps.
  
  

Although the last three are prospective, telcos get immediate relief without awaiting the formulation of complex solutions. The relief is temporary though, as outstanding dues must be paid with interest. Unless much more is done, there will be a prolonged attrition, with high opportunity costs from the continuing non-availability of services that severely constrain our capacity and productivity.

Meanwhile, another significant reform was introduced unobtrusively: Active network sharing. Blocking active sharing amounts to depriving the country of full utilisation of capital-intensive resources. Imagine having separate private road systems, or gas pipelines, and insisting that vehicles (or gas) must go from place to place only on their own networks. This was the situation in telecom until interconnection was made mandatory, but the latter did not eliminate network duplication, whereas active network sharing allows for eliminating it.

Thereafter, news that the government may change its position on spectrum charges due suggests more pragmatism. If the above interpretation is correct, the subtlety and quick action while avoiding opposition by not seeming to give away too much augur well.

For transformative reforms and a genuine revival, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology could take the approach that worked reasonably well for NTP-99, with coordinated planning and initiatives through the PMO across ministries and corporations, and external advice as appropriate. While it was not perfect, the NTP-99’s adoption of revenue sharing succeeded in expanding mobile telephony enormously. Learning from that experience in handling the details may help to avoid situations such as the legal wrangles on the scope of revenues, and the false starts. For instance, the government’s share was set too high initially at 15 per cent, and thereafter, spectrum auctions after the “2G scam” crippled the sector because of the “winner’s curse”, as auctions did in much of the world. We had best avoid such situations.

Wi-Fi Small Cells

The ongoing evolution to small cells amplifies the need for sharing. Mobile handoff to Wi-Fi is already the norm for 4G. Ubiquitous 4G networks and later upgrade to 5G and 6G will require the installation of many more small cells, with Wi-Fi for high-speed user access. These could augment existing Wi-Fi bands (2.4 and 5 GHz) with 6 GHz and 60 GHz when these bands are permitted. Proliferation of small cells will be more feasible because of lower costs and easier installation with wireless point-to-point links instead of fibre, and mandatory sharing. “Wireless fibre” links could use light-licensed (open access to licensed service providers for connecting to the internet) spectrum in the 60 GHz (V-band) and 70-80 GHz (E-band). Gigabit delivery at far lower cost than fibre could be deployed across urban, semi-urban, and rural markets.

Small cells for users need to be built out with “wireless fibre” links from where fibre terminates in much of the country, in urban as well as rural areas. An alternative depending on costs is satellite links to small cells. In effect, the need is for the national fibre network, BharatNet, to be extended to non-urban users outside district and block headquarters. Small cells funded by the Universal Service Obligation Fund combined with the BSNL’s and other installed networks could fulfill this need, with service providers given non-discriminatory access on payment through revenue sharing. A consortium approach with private sector leads could be considered.

Shared Spectrum & Infrastructure

A burdensome remaining constraint for network proliferation is licensed spectrum costs. Yet, the alternative of giving access to a spectrum pool without auctions for a share of revenues would probably result in much higher government revenues, as happened with licence fees after NTP-99 (see charts).

Chart 1: Operator Revenues ($ Billion)

https://www.ibef.org/download/Telecommunications-June-2020.pdf

Chart 2: Revenue Share Collections Exceed Auction Payments After NTP-99

          Telecom Auction Fees Foregone vs Licence Fees + Spectrum Charges

For explanation, see: https://organizing-india.blogspot.com/2020/08/configuring-indias-digital-ecosystem.html

Shared access by licensed telcos to pooled spectrum will enable broadband for more areas and people, with full utilisation of unused spectrum greatly increasing traffic and revenues. The DoT needs to start with regulations for spectrum bands in 60 GHz, 70-80 GHz, and 6 GHz. Thereafter, regulations could be considered for shared spectrum without auctions. (1)

Debt Resolution for Cash Flows

An immediate priority for the sector is sustainable cash flows. The burden of adjusted gross revenue (AGR) and spectrum usage dues arose from misconceived policy errors, by efforts to include unrelated revenues, and overcharging for spectrum. Debt restructuring customarily involves elements such as reduced principal (“haircuts”), interest waivers, and extension of repayment periods, to enable sustainable cash flows. Much of the principal for AGR dues was created by including revenues unrelated to the licences to be paid for, an error corrected going forward. Past licence-related revenues would be much less, and favourable judgments prior to 2019 upheld this. The interest component in AGR dues is about three times the principal. The government could justifiably adopt policies to reduce most or all outstandings with this reasoning, as also consideration of the effort, cost and hardship endured by service providers, their employees, and the public for service deprivation of the critical support that broadband can/could have provide/(d). Further, this would also facilitate investment for better services.

Corrective Policies, Laws, Regulations

A participative process on these issues starting with debt resolution could be used to frame policies going forward, including the requisite legislation and regulations. The above measures can revive and invigorate our telecom sector.

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Shyam (no space) Ponappa at gmail dot com

(1): See “Enable Spectrum Usage on Feasible Terms” at:  https://organizing-india.blogspot.com/2020/03/indias-self-goal-in-telecom.html

Telcos Need Three More Bold Decisions

Users and service providers are swimming against the tide even after the abolition of retro tax.

Shyam Ponappa    |   August 24, 2021

Undoing the retrospective tax amendment affecting Vodafone Group and Cairn Energy among others was an excellent move, and proves what the government can do. In this spirit, two more shackles must go for us to fully exploit telecom and digitisation:

a) Adjusted gross revenues (AGR) for telecom operators need to be defined rationally as licence-related revenues by policy and legislation.

b) Spectrum allocation and pricing need a complete revamp. Appropriate policy and legislation can enable spectrum use as a resource for the common good, paid for by a share of revenues for usage instead of auctions. This will make spectrum costs an operating expense, and will not require enterprises to make up-front capital investments, as with other resources: Electricity, water, and leased land.

Like the retro tax, these self-imposed constraints have restricted telecom and digitisation support, limiting our capacity. It is like swimming against the current, whereas policy changes can remove these limitations, enabling service providers and users to swim with the current. Removing all three would do that, putting India’s telecom and broadband into a much higher trajectory in realising our overall potential.

The government must frame policies for the public interest in communications and digitisation in a fair, transparent way, to break out of the absurd situation of pricing spectrum at five times the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development nations, whose per capita income is 15-20 times higher. This will help us resolve the contradictions of the lowest-priced broadband with the highest cost structure, and atrocious service quality.

Policies to Clear Impediments

AGR: The overreach in the AGR definition is a self-created obstacle. The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) left the term undefined in the licence agreements in 1999. It was to be defined with the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India’s (Trai’s) recommendation, but when finalising licence agreements in 2002, the DoT ignored the recommendation that AGR should include only revenues from cellular mobile services. The operators’ appeal before the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) in 2003 was upheld in 2006; the DoT appealed in the Supreme Court. The SC refused to intervene, but ruled that the DoT could pursue its concerns with the TDSAT. The TDSAT in August 2007 accepted most of the recommendations made by Trai. And so it went, with many disputes and appeals by the UPA as well as the NDA governments, until a TDSAT judgment in 2015 overturned previous TDSAT orders, excluding only capital receipts. Later, an SC judgment in 2019 even included capital receipts.¹

The following instances illustrate the absurd claims, contradictions, and orders:

• The government had informed the SC in a hearing in 2011 that non-telecom revenues were not to be included in the AGR.²  Yet, the TDSAT judgment of 2015 citing this statement ruled exactly the opposite, excluding only capital transactions.
  
  
• The SC’s judgment of October 24, 2019, dismissed the Trai and TDSAT recommendations of 2006 and 2007, and extended the definition of AGR to all non-telecom revenues. Previously, various courts had reportedly set aside such claims in 2006, 2007, 2011, and 2015.³
  
  
• Thereafter, in what appears as inappropriate discrimination in the absence of explicit policies, the SC in 2019 excluded public sector dues amounting to Rs 2.7 trillion from GAIL, Oil India, Power Grid, and so on. Expressing outrage at such demands on PSUs, the SC insisted that private operators must pay their dues of Rs 1.47 trillion. No wonder the DoT and the rest of the government seem confused, because like the retro tax amendment, these actions appear to be arbitrary.

Therefore, the government must frame a policy definition for AGR informed by Trai recommendations that is rational, in the public interest for better communications, fair, non-discriminatory between state-owned and privately-owned companies, and transparent.  This will satisfy the SC condition of due process according to government policies.

Spectrum Allocation & Pricing

Current technology favours giving operators shared use of spectrum and networks across all technologies, because coverage and capacity increase at lower cost. Yet, because wireless communications evolved from a time when mitigating interference was the primary technological concern, the method adopted was of exclusive spectrum assignment (“allocation” in common parlance) of distinct bands to each operator. This method, initially a technological necessity, then became the customary practice because governments in many countries sought high fees from spectrum auctions. Many countries suffered as this burden led to the collapse of the sector for a decade.⁴  India was one of these, because the meteoric rise of our mobile telephony stalled, and is now so shoddy. The damage is pervasive, because of inadequate communications infrastructure that affects many areas, such as energy and water management, education and skilling, healthcare, and productivity across sectors —commerce, transportation, hospitality and tourism, manufacturing, agriculture— and in mitigating environmental impact.

Technology needs wider swathes of spectrum for high data throughput. It is also able to manage interference much better. We cannot have effective coverage without better wireless access networks. As we move towards 5G and beyond, the emphasis on wireless communications will increase. This can happen through sharing of spectrum and facilities among operators, which will likely be the norm in 5G and 6G, providing a high multiplier to network usage, while considerably reducing capital investment needs countrywide.

The government has to frame policies that help to do this, by removing obstacles such as retro taxes, AGR, and capital expenditure on spectrum. Replacing an extortionary approach to the communications sector with a constructive emphasis on infrastructure support will get us there, as well as enhance government revenues.⁵  Policies can be framed to help achieve better health, education, skilling, productivity, and living conditions. The major changes of using spectrum as a shared resource with payment for usage through a share of revenues, in combination with undoing retro taxes and AGR, are the required steps. There are different ways to do this, and the government needs to steer the process through consultations to an acceptable way for us to move forward with 4G, 5G and beyond, for effective communications and digitisation.

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Shyam (no space) Ponappa at gmail dot com

1: https://www.theleaflet.in/agr-order-a-case-of-subjective-judicial-overreach/

2: https://dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/TDSAT%20Judgment%2023-04-2015.pdf

3: https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/why-isnt-govt-at-sc-on-agr-ruling-threatening-of-telcos-like-airtel-vodafone-idea/1775075/

4: https://organizingindia.blogspot.com/2011/02/spectrum-auctions-jhatka-or-halal.html

5: https://organizing-india.blogspot.com/2020/08/configuring-indias-digital-ecosystem.html

Arbitration Awards And The Public Interest

An objective, analytical approach to pursuing or resisting claims and arbitration awards is advisable.

Shyam Ponappa    |   August 5, 2021

The arbitration awards against India’s retroactive tax claims now pose a serious threat. Cairn Energy has a freeze order on Indian government assets in Paris, and similar developments are possible in the US from actions by Cairn and Devas Multimedia. Are there ways to mitigate these threats and reputational damage? Objective analysis of the facts is advisable before deciding the balance of interest in choosing to continue as before, or to consider changes.

The issues go beyond the legitimacy of awards and India’s sovereign rights, to India’s exposure and its commercial implications. The country’s rights are not being questioned; the scrutiny is of fair and equitable treatment under investment treaties, and changes in agreed terms. The choice is to continue as before and take the consequences, or to undertake an informed, objective analysis of likely costs and benefits of resisting or accepting awards before deciding what to do in our interests. The options are to litigate endlessly, or accept awards, or to negotiate acceptable settlements. Resolution would enable reallocation of our energies — our political, administrative, and judicial resources, and society’s productive capacity and mind-share — to more constructive purposes.

Additional considerations include substantial, continuing damage to India’s business reputation for not honouring agreements and awards, and for resorting to repeated appeals. Ideally, dilatory tactics need to be replaced with being more reasonable and less arbitrary. Strategies in the public interest need to be developed, such as the attitude to arbitration in not accepting unfavourable awards. The indirect costs and collateral damage are enormous, such as to the telecom and energy sectors since 2012, to affected companies and employees, to the investment climate, and the cascading effects through the economy. The disarray and inadequacy in telecom, for instance, are partly attributable to this factor. While foreign investment is increasing, the type of investors also matters. Present investments favour quick profits from the market, with less emphasis in building productive capacity in infrastructure, manufacturing, agriculture and so on.

Pranab Mukherjee, who introduced the retroactive tax as finance minister in 2012, wrote in his memoirs that despite the angst, his successors maintained the same stance. He had said at the time that if the law had not been changed, it would have cost the government Rs 40,000 to Rs 50,000 crore, as companies who had not contested similar demands would claim refunds. If this is a fact, how should it affect government decisions? The most important criteria presumably are cash flows, including awards if enforced, and reputational effects going forward.

Compulsions for retaining a law begin from inception, because once the government makes a law, there is a due process to be followed, or the appearance of it. International tax claims cannot be surrendered easily because of the political price for appearing to be weak, or selling out the public interest. While resolution can be by full or partial payment or by litigation, in practice, the default is litigation, followed by protracted appeals. Political and civil decision-makers have no invested commitment — “skin in the game” — to push for an early settlement. Anyone who exercises judgement that results in settling for a lesser amount runs the risk of being subjected to ignominy and accusations of bias or corruption. For politicians, the reputational risk in not pursuing claims is very high. Even Arun Jaitley as finance minister, who was earlier Vodafone’s attorney and called it “tax terrorism”, did not or could not undo it. Further, many officials, including finance and tax authorities and politicians, behave as if they are obliged to defend the indefensible. They seem unaware that similar compulsions drive legitimate private sector concerns. Shareholders expect companies to prosecute fair claims and defend against unfair demands, and companies cannot give up prosecution or defence if they have reasonable chances of winning. In legal battles of attrition, if the government takes a stand that others consider unreasonable, the country pays, while lawyers prosper.

Awards against India include Cairn’s $1.7 billion, Rs 22,100-crore tax claims against Vodafone that was disallowed by an international court (with legal costs of about Rs 85 crore to be paid), and possibly Vedanta’s claim of $3 billion related to Cairn’s transaction that is pending but could be upheld. India’s appeals against Vedanta’s and Vodafone’s awards are pending. If these appeals are dismissed, together with awards to Devas and its shareholders of $1.2 billion for the cancellation of its contract with Antrix, the total rises to over Rs 40,000 crore.

The government has resisted Devas’ awards successfully for years, and has raised the accusation of fraud in a still pending arbitration with Deutsche Telekom, a former investor in Devas. Meanwhile, internally, the government has probed these accusations repeatedly, and apparently accepted that they are unwarranted. (1)

If this defence fails and/or if there is actual seizure of assets abroad, India may be forced to reconsider. Accepting the awards is also not easy, because it needs radical changes in the government’s approach and behaviour, carried through by changes to all of society/us, in adhering closely to terms. Governments everywhere are sometimes not transparent, and ours has a colonial and feudal legacy of rulers and subjects with pernicious practices on both sides. It is a legacy that has become worse with time, and perpetuates problems in many areas of governance, the economy, and society, because it is pervasive. This mindset will have to change for a more open approach, objective analysis, and decisions based on facts and reason. If this process is begun, it augurs well for our prospects. Cairn, Vodafone, and Devas have reportedly shown willingness to settle. The government should seriously consider evaluating the pros and cons of asset seizure and indirect damages, compared with other options, including possible settlements. By ending these disputes quickly and well, we can hope to build a more reasonable and stable business and investment environment, and better business practices.

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Shyam (no space) Ponappa at gmail dot com

1.a: This article summarises the details: https://thewire.in/government/india-isro-arbitration-antrix-devas

1.b: India’s treaty-based disputes: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/country/96/india

Order & Stability in Power Supply

 

India's markets in electricity are roiled by low and unstable prices, with uneven service quality.

Shyam Ponappa   |   July 1, 2021

Is it good for consumers when prices crash? After an intuitive “yes”, reflection on one’s own and society’s long-term interests, as in the example below, may lead to the realisation that quality cannot be sustained below a reasonable price. In the same way, overambitious targets without detailed plans and unrealistic policies create turbulence and instability, such as financing not being available for constructing coal-based power plants. This will mean shortages unless sufficient power is available from new sources.¹

Energy considerations are simultaneous problems, and solutions must consider interconnected factors. A third issue is bringing order and stability to electricity markets, for which India needs investors with significant capital willing to invest at scale for slower payback than in high-tech aggregation, for example. The groundwork must be done to handle large-scale targets and projects, because big players operate at scale, avoiding smaller projects. The opposite aspect is the integration of rooftop solar for net metering,² which has been capped this year at 10 kW, thereby excluding the most promising upscale residential and corporate categories. Another aspect that needs resolution is the financial capacity of distribution companies.

The case of SoftBank’s investment in solar power in India and its exit is an example of the difficulties of bringing order and scale to India’s power sector.

SoftBank’s Solar Gambit in India

In 2015, Japan’s SoftBank Group CEO Masayoshi Son announced the intention to invest $20 billion in India in solar projects through SB Energy (SBE), a venture with Bharti Enterprises and Taiwan’s Foxconn. It seemed ideal for India. With abundant sunshine and a big potential market, the logic for large solar projects was always compelling. Prime Minister Narendra Modi had raised the solar target for 2022 from 20 GW to 100 GW. India had about 4 GW largely from rural and rooftop projects, priced 50 per cent higher than power from coal. Despite a good start, in time, SoftBank’s price expectations proved to be too high.

Prices fell thereafter because of cheap solar modules from China, and increasing competition, perhaps influenced by SoftBank’s exuberant presence. SBE’s winning bids dropped from Rs 4.63/unit in December 2015 in Andhra Pradesh to Rs 2.45/unit in Rajasthan in May 2017, which SBE maintained was profitable. Solar power became half that of coal. Bids dropped as low as Rs 1.99 in December 2020, as lower-cost pension funds bid aggressively. However, prices firmed up this year, and winning bids in May ranged from Rs 2.51 to Rs 2.69.

Meanwhile, SoftBank could not get the government to offer a massive tender of 900 GW, more than double India’s capacity, despite announcing an increased investment intent of $60-100 billion.

Facing regulatory problems such as land not allocated for transmission lines, delays in payments, and attempts at renegotiation of its power purchase agreement in Andhra Pradesh, SoftBank began losing interest. Ironically, prices now are near the Rs 2.70 that SBE had bid in 2018 for 1 GW of a tender where the government expected a much lower bid from SBE for the full 3 GW tender, and rejected other similar bids, accusing SBE of cartelisation. Last month, SoftBank sold its solar assets to Adani Green Energy Ltd (AGEL) and shifted its solar focus to the US. It continues to invest actively in Indian high-tech, however, committing $2 billion in 2021 by the end of May.

This is insufficient solar capacity from an environmental perspective as well as in terms of opportunity cost, i.e., the available solar energy. The short point is that India needs investors like SoftBank, with the capacity and willingness to invest in slower-payback infrastructure.

The government could not entertain large bids to the extent that SoftBank was willing to invest (assuming a tender for 100 GW, of their expressed interest in 900 GW). The preponderance of coal will continue because the current annual tendering capacity is 6-8 GW. This means higher costs and carbon footprint until the government is able to accommodate larger-scale investor interest. It will require resolution of a serious obstacle, the stressed financials of state distribution companies, realistic tariff expectations, and larger tendering capacity.

SBE focused on quality and scale, outsourcing its clean design and installation to high-quality Engineering, Procurement and Construction contractors. Its low-cost finance and capacity were offset by a high cost structure, in a low-bid environment. India may not be ready for such investors, because price trumps quality, even if quality is reasonably priced. But we do need to nurture serious investors willing to invest in electricity and other infrastructure.

Our markets in electricity, telecom and broadband are roiled by low and unstable prices, with uneven service quality. Our interests would be best served if our policies aim for integrated, stable services at reasonable prices that might not necessarily be least cost in the interests of efficacy. This is what we need to drive the economy in a sustained manner, to provide its foundation and fuel its growth.

Government policies and regulations need to be configured towards overarching objectives that are aligned or at least not contradictory. Various streams within and across sectors must be integrated, such as fuel sources and electricity generation, to converge towards objectives. This will require Central and state governments to evolve integrated plans and develop interdepartmental coordination processes to steer the energy sector.³ A prerequisite is resolving the financial problems of state distribution companies, including payment discipline.

If a genuine effort is made to work through these and scope a large, practicable solar tender (of 5 GW or 10 GW), with a process of repeating/escalating it over time, the government could seek to initiate discussions for such contracts with two or three select investors.

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Shyam (no space) Ponappa at gmail dot com

1:   "Does India need more coal power?"

https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/does-india-need-more-coal-power-121062901741_1.html

2: See “The economics of ‘net’ and ‘gross’ metering: The Punjab example”: https://carboncopy.info/rooftop-solar-and-discoms-a-case-of-putting-the-cart-before-the-horse/

3: India had an Integrated Energy Policy, compiled by the Planning Commission for 2006 to 2030: (http://niti.gov.in/planningcommission.gov.in/docs/reports/genrep/rep_intengy.pdf). If discontinued, this needs updating with probabilistic modelling, and conversion to action plans through interdepartmental processes empowered to execute these plans

Catch Up On 5G Mindset

Our policies need to change by permitting cost-less changes that build network systems and service delivery.

Shyam Ponappa   |   June 3, 2021

The anticipation and excitement about 5G or full-fledged 4G is all about apps and user experience. People focus on user devices such as smartphones and computers, whereas delivery requires end-to-end network systems — for education, skill development, training, software as a service, healthcare, transportation, retail, travel, or entertainment. For these, our foundations are sorely lacking. The most deficient are the long lead-time, slow payback, difficult aspects of “plumbing”, akin to completing the user-side networks of water pipes and sewerage for water supply, or networks for electricity. As with the plumbing, we need the network development of all the links to experience end-to-end, high-speed communications, as explained below.

Indian “unicorns”, tech startups valued at over a billion dollars, have been growing latterly at a dizzying pace (1). Optimists see them as a way out of our primordial mess. For pragmatists, profitability and staying power will prove they are not just examples of irrational exuberance, although there is no doubt many provide value through aggregation and convenience. The caveats are that they disrupt markets, and their spread is largely in services, except for very few in pharmaceuticals/biotechnology and renewable energy.

These services depend on the structured, hierarchical organisation of equipment and systems, what the tech marketplace calls the technology stack. “Tech-stacks” are systems made up of layers that fit in a logical sequence at each functional level of a process to deliver their “products” to users at successive levels, whether the deliveries are considered goods or services.

Now, users engage with apps as front-end interfaces. Some people are aware of the levels beyond, i.e., the operating systems, the technical features of the devices, and the communications service providers/telcos (Chart 1).

Chart 1

Adapted from: https://the-ken.com/the-nutgraf/jio-is-in-the-endgame-now/

Very few look beyond that, to the levels of the telcos’ technology stack or back-end. Yet, this is where our problems begin: In dense commercial or residential areas, for instance, laying new cables is very difficult and expensive, whereas wireless links can be easier and cheaper. This is also true for rural/semi-urban areas, where the profit potential may be more limited. The network stack or system comprises user devices connecting to towers or access points, which can be cellular or Wi-Fi devices, which connect to aggregation points through backhaul across the “middle-mile”, and from there to the core network (Chart 2).

Many in urban India have fibre connections up to their access points, whether those devices are Wi-Fi or cellular base stations. Others may have a coaxial or ethernet cable up to their access points, and a wireless connection to aggregation points, which connect with the fibre core. These links in our networks is where we are deficient.

Early on, India’s policy-makers expected market mechanisms to provide these lower-order layers of the stack. Despite evidence to the contrary, our policy-makers and regulators apparently still continue to expect this, although laying cables to every household is simply not feasible in India.

Self-Constraining Mindsets

It took nine years to enable full use of the 5 GHz Wi-Fi bands in India (in 2018, instead of in 2009/10). Until then, 5 GHz Wi-Fi devices could not be used to their full potential in India because of our self-imposed restrictions. So, they were unusable for Wi-Fi hotspots or for backhaul, one reason there are so few hotspots.

It would have cost nothing apart from the effort for the authorities to develop enabling policies and make them work. There would have been some operating and administrative costs, but no capital investment. It was not the lack of technology, nor the lack of capital, nor material resources, nor of organisation. It was a mental block, a constraining mindset, that prevented successive governments from removing these shackles. It was a wilful restriction of available technology and productivity tools.

Could these policy constraints have been aggravated by the turbulence created by the CAG Report in 2010? Possibly, and the chilling effect on constructive spectrum policies has endured. Think of what it means to constrain ourselves in this way, because more changes are needed to complete and enhance the links in our networks.

So What Do We Need?

We have the right policies for 5 GHz Wi-Fi. We also need user access to high-speed wireless (6 and 60 GHz), and for telcos to have short-distance and intermediate-distance backhaul (60 GHz up to 1.5 km; 70-80 GHz up to 4-5 km), in addition to the 5G bands being considered. Without these, the linkages are incomplete or of insufficient capacity.

The changes required are, to permit licensed operators to use 60 GHz and 70-80 GHz for backhaul/middle-mile for network capacity quickly and at least cost, and 6 GHz and 60 GHz for Wi-Fi user access. A realistic way for a developing country to do this is through shared infrastructure, including spectrum and Radio Access Networks, with consortium ownership and government participation. Until this happens, we are likely to be restricted in our ability to deal with our needs for livelihood and well-being, with the impossibility of enormous expense of multiple networks, the impracticality of laying cables everywhere, and without the financial justification or capacity to do it.

It is like trying to create cities or become a manufacturing or agricultural powerhouse without the infrastructure of water-sewerage-electricity-logistics-communications as the basis not only for all the hardware, but also for the skilled human resources and “wetware” trained and accultured to make the most of all of this.

Enabling rules and executive decisions are the first steps. Organising appropriately to capitalise on and implement the possibilities in the public interest is the next. This will need organising consortiums for sharing infrastructure, spectrum payment based on usage, and so on. Until our policy-makers understand and engage with these self-imposed obstacles, remove them, and force the issue of organised high-speed wireless in a practical, sustainable way, most of our people cannot have the basic appurtenances required to equip themselves to live and work well today.

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Shyam (no space) Ponappa at gmail dot com

1: Indian Unicorns - https://plus.credit-suisse.com/rpc4/ravDocView?docid=V7qfQq2AN-Wd1W

Covid Prevention Guidance Needed

Authoritative guidance if possible on prophylaxis and early treatment would help.

Shyam Ponappa   |   May 7, 2021

For people outside the medical community with limited knowledge of medicine, there is a need for informed advice on preventives for Covid-19, if our experts know of any. We know of the advice to wear masks, maintain distance, and sanitise our hands. Beyond that, with all the information and opinion swirling in the press and the media, what exactly is one to do? Apart from the vaccination initiative and behaviour protocols, we need advice on possible preventives, and early-stage treatment. While it is a difficult call, the consideration of including preventives, if any are known, may help strengthen safety protocols (masking, distancing, and hand sanitisation), as would advice on early-stage treatment.

As lay people, we encounter information about possible preventives.  Compiled information from a single, informed source on potential prophylactics, and efforts to evaluate possibilities, would help. If there are compounds known to be safe that might help, perhaps authorities could consider dissemination, instead of waiting for proof positive. If trials are to be designed and coordinated, these could be facilitated to the extent possible.

This is not a time to add to or expect more from our burdened healthcare system. Yet, their ability to advise and to facilitate trials may have no substitute. If the hope is that the private sector will step in, reflection on the investment of time, effort, cost, and risk compared with the profit potential suggests that may take much longer.

Possible preventives

Preventives seem to be under the radar in our defences against the virus. One is left wondering about their efficacy, or whether it is the difficulty in validation through trials that explains the apparent lack of promotion of preventives or early-stage treatments, as described below. Two possible candidates are povidone-iodine, known commonly by the brand name “Betadine”, and Ivermectin.

( a) Povidone-iodine, one brand being Betadine, is a formulation of iodine with a water-soluble polymer (povidone) that enables slow iodine release, resulting in greater effectiveness as a germicide and virucide, with no stinging or staining. There are exceptions, however, for people with thyroid problems, pregnant women, and those undergoing radioiodine therapy.

The Betadine site in the USA disclaims its efficacy against Covid-19.¹  However, several recent studies show that povidone-iodine is an effective virucidal in the nose and mouth, including against the SARS-CoV-2.²  The citations below report virucidal activity against SARS-CoV-2, and reduction in the severity of early-stage infection by limiting the viral load.

Established practice and several studies confirm that povidone-iodine is effective and safe, excluding certain categories. Could this not be promoted as a possible prophylactic? With evidence, as in the citations below, barring compelling reasons to the contrary, the authorities could decide on its inclusion in our protocol.

(b) Ivermectin is in the protocol of the Uttar Pradesh health department for healthcare professionals as a preventive, and along with doxycycline for early-stage treatment. This is despite WHO’s statements not supporting its use. Ivermectin has been used for years all over the world to treat children and adults for roundworm and intestinal parasites, as well as for skin diseases such as scabies. If one or both are effective and generally considered safe with certain exclusions, could experts evaluate including these in preventive protocols? This would be in addition to vaccination, masking, distancing, and hand-sanitisation. If validation is required, the authorities could consider possibly facilitating trials.

[Added May 12, 2021: Real time meta analysis - Ivermectin - 54 studies:

https://ivmmeta.com] 

Early-stage treatment

Apart from Ivermectin (to be considered), the ayurvedic practice of coconut oil “pulling”, or swishing/lavaging in the mouth, has undergone trials in the Philippines and Indonesia. Second, trials are reportedly under consideration here for an inhaled recombinant interferon. Virgin coconut oil has been studied by the Philippines for medicinal purposes for decades. Reports on its use for treatment against Covid-19 were published from late 2020. The two citations indicate their findings for [added later: prophylaxis as well as] early-stage treatment.³

Bolstering Immunity — Interferon Beta-1a (SNG001): In 2003, faculty members from the University of Southampton started a company, Synairgen, for drug discovery and biotechnology in respiratory diseases. In 2009, they developed an inhaled form of recombinant interferon beta-1a, SNG001, patented in the USA as IFN-beta. This was for people with asthma and with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, who are especially susceptible to seasonal colds and the flu caused by coronaviruses such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-Coronavirus (SARS-CoV), and the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS). SNG001 works by providing localised concentrations of the immune protein to strengthen a user’s defences.

Interferon beta-1a in injectable form has been in use since the 1990s for the treatment of multiple sclerosis. Subsequently, it was found to be effective against SARS-CoV, MERS, and recently, SARS-CoV-2. For acceptance in treating Covid-19, it must clear successive trials as must any medication. These are expensive, difficult, and time consuming. The difficulties beyond high costs include the availability of suitable candidates, trained professionals, and time. Trials are also often delayed because of staffing shortages, space-material-and-funding constraints, and reluctant or unavailable patients. Sometimes, trials are called off for reasons such as insufficient enrolment. These factors have delayed SNG001’s deployment so far, despite a good safety record.

Encouraging Phase 2 results were announced in mid-2020,⁴ but it has taken a year to get Phase 3 trials going in about 20 countries, aiming for over 600 patients. In India, the Subject Expert Committee is reportedly evaluating a proposal for clinical trials. Could this product be considered for immediate use under medical supervision?

Government-sponsored trials

The Philippines government has championed trials such as of virgin coconut oil, Ivermectin, and Melatonin.³ Their example is inspiring, although the small sizes detract from the potential gains. Perhaps our experts could consider whether Ivermectin as a preventive and for early-stage treatment needs validation through trials here, or could be included in our protocols.

It would help to have a public advisory on Betadine gargles and nasal spray if they are effective, and likewise for Ivermectin. If possible, advice on the early-stage use of inhaled corticosteroids (Ciclesonide or Budesonide) to protect the lungs and airways would also be very helpful.

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Shyam (no space) Ponappa at gmail dot com


1: https://betadine.com/covid-19/

2: https://journalotohns.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40463-020-00474-x;

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7341475/;

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32608097https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamaotolaryngology/fullarticle/2770785

3: https://fnri.dost.gov.ph/index.php/programs-and-projects/news-and-announcement/800-virgin-coconut-oil-vco-study-results-on-covid-19-suspect-and-probable-cases-released-by-dost-fnri;

https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2021/4/16/virgin-coconut-oil-COVID-19-patients.html

4: https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/study/NCT04385095