Showing posts with label South Korea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label South Korea. Show all posts

Thursday, June 4, 2020

Unlock = Open, not Choked!


Don't let a virus stall initiatives and weaken the economy.


Shyam Ponappa  |  June 4, 2020

A recent column in this newspaper juxtaposed the way smart, experienced people have high expectations, only to be disappointed by our weak state’s predictable failures (Strong expectations from a weak state, May 25). Is there justification for any optimism, or at least hope? Here is an exploration of reasons for persisting in the face of continued odds, and pushing for economic recovery. Why should one persist with constructive efforts? Because a rising tide lifts all boats, and one’s contribution can affect outcomes. And because attempts at partial opening will not suffice.
There could be new economic opportunities by way of capacity, logistics or markets, or a wider array of sustainable consumer choices, whether for manufactured goods, services, or activities. Think back, and surely you have witnessed government action extend beyond the grind of just keeping everything going.
One instance of major change that affected the economy was in 1990, when the secretary of the Department of Electronics N Vittal worked in close consultation with industry. This resulted in path-breaking reforms, such as the setting up of “high-speed” links (of a mere 64 kilobits per second at the time) between Information Technology (IT) companies in Indian software technology parks and their international clients, and various tax incentives that followed much later. The offshore services industry gathered strength, and later expanded to cover IT-enabled services with call centres and business processing, extending to knowledge processing.
Likewise, telecommunications reforms began in 1990, when prime minister Chandra Shekhar led a shaky government for a brief period. The telecommunications ministry was looking for a private sector consultant. Through an invisible network, an investment banker who had been a management consultant in San Francisco was asked to look into telecommunications reforms. This led to the setting up of the Athreya Committee and its recommendations: On separating policy-making from operations, corporatising the Mahanagar Telephone Nigam as an operating company for Delhi and Mumbai, and Bharat Sanchar Nigam for the rest, while recommending access to private sector operators. All this was not smooth and painless, and took years, but did happen eventually, although the separation remains untidy.
By 1998, telecommunications operators were in a situation similar to the predicament some months ago, of weak revenues and a debt overhang, with some differences. There were many operators with heavy debt because of government charges and limited revenue generation capacity, because of smaller networks and less clients. This is the “winners’ curse” of auctions, when exorbitant amounts are paid to government for auctions, with nothing left for building and running networks and enterprises to generate the revenues to justify those payments. There are exceptions, as in the social democrat Nordic states, or state-controlled allocations as in China, or in Japan for a number of years.
Key people in government grasped this. The Prime Minister’s Office consulted with industry and external consultants, and took action. This resulted in the New Telecom Policy 1999 (NTP-99), whereby the major change was converting up-front licence fees to revenue sharing, although the policy was uneven because of cherry-picked recommendations. Initially, the government set the percentage share too high. It took years to reduce and trigger rapid growth. This came about through reduced government charges, calling party pays (which cut call costs), and a price war, brought on by the stealth entry of a new technology (CDMA) network, which the authorities allowed despite incumbent protests. Mobile services then grew exponentially from 2004, until the 2G spectrum scam surfaced in 2011.
A stream of articles advocated extending revenue-sharing to spectrum fees as for licence fees, and for shared infrastructure including spectrum. In 2011, a senior official in the DoT was sufficiently impressed to explore the possibility of evaluating alternatives using simulation models. But the 2G scam broke after the first few meetings of DoT officials, and this process was aborted. Instead of major changes based on simulations, a mere statement of intent about spectrum pooling and sharing made it into NTP-2012.
There were other incredible developments, although with no apparent results (yet). For instance, in 2013, a non-governmental organisation, the Centre for Internet and Society in Bengaluru, arranged for the former chief technology officer of the US Federal Communications Commission, Jon Peha, who had pioneered changes in America, to meet with top officials of the DoT, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, and some IIT professors. The latter conducted successful trials using TV White Space spectrum for the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. The details are many, but the point is that constructive advocacy can have an impact.
Reviving the Economy Now
We are in a difficult situation, with our economy and society battered by the lockdown and much else. We will need to do everything possible to recover, and it will take years. Attempts at partial opening will not suffice. Systemic revival calls for unrestricted flows of money, people, activity, and goods and services.
While reactivating the economy, we will need to be cautious through the pandemic (through “social distancing”, using masks to reduce infection, avoiding close contact with outsiders, and so on). But survivors have to live with this virus, as with other strains of viruses and bacteria, and other threats.
Consider traffic accidents, which average over 145,000 deaths annually (data 2013-2017: https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/chapter-1A-traffic-accidents-2017_0.pdf).  Extrapolating, this means a million fatalities in seven years, yet we don’t shut down all traffic. By comparison, Covid-19 had about 6,000 fatalities since January.
A proportion of the medical fraternity opines that (a) there is community spread of Covid-19, and (b) with many cases milder than the expected severity, that most patients need home care rather than hospitalisation. If these continue, our health systems will not be overwhelmed with severe cases. Also, so far, India has had a relatively low fatality rate of 2.8 per cent (see chart).
As long as these factors hold, our priority has to be unfettered economic activity. Countries with higher fatality rates, including Sweden, China, Japan and Germany in the chart, have open economic activity (with tremendous productivity). We will weaken and our problems will escalate if we are held back.

Shyam (no space) Ponappa at gmail dot com

Thursday, February 3, 2011

Spectrum Auctions: 'Jhatka' or 'Halal'?


The choice is between sudden death and a slow one

Shyam Ponappa / February 3, 2011

Why do people advocate spectrum and licence auctions? Is it because they think auctions work? Is it the appeal of an ideology, like capitalism or socialism? Or is it because governments often collect large sums, and auctions seem fair (in a market-driven sense) and transparent? Theorists apparently cannot find better ways to allocate spectrum or licences, despite the alternative of technical and financial short-listing followed by a lottery. Yet, while desiring high government collections, people really want reasonably-priced good infrastructure, and continue to rail against government waste. Let’s review some so-called “successful” auctions and what followed.

1994: The US spectrum auction

Prior to 1994, the US used to allocate spectrum on demonstrated capacity and merit (“beauty contests”). The spectrum auction in 1994 netted record bids. The Federal Communications Commission chairman reportedly said: “Auctions have proven once again to be a success not only by awarding licences to those that value them most, but also by decreasing the national debt.” Then disaster struck, with a number of “successful” bidders declaring bankruptcy. As BusinessWeek put it in 2010 with the benefit of hindsight, “... over time, beauty contests have delivered fewer problems and higher value to society than have airwave auctions.”1

1994: India telecom licences

In 1994, India auctioned telecom licences. Chaos followed owing to overbidding and default. Thereafter, the sector struggled from one contention to the next, with the government and operators deadlocked by 1998. The New Telecom Policy of 1999 provided a breakthrough, tossing aside the auction bids in favour of shared revenues. After the percentage share was reduced to reasonable levels, and “Calling Party Pays” halved tariffs in 2003, mobile services grew exponentially to over 725 million subscribers by 2010. Interestingly, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India estimated that auction fee foregone till March 2007 was over Rs 19,000 crore, whereas actual revenue collections were double, at Rs 40,000 crore; by March 2010, the collections were 80,000 crore.

2000: The UK 3G auctions

The 3G auction in the UK was hailed as a spectacular success, reaping bids of about $35 billion.

2000: The France and Germany 3G auctions

Germany followed, netting $67 billion, and the finance minister quipped that the auction was for unexpected revenue to pay the national debt. France demanded a flat fee of $4.5 billion per licence.

The dotcom bubble burst in March 2000, followed by communications and technology companies a year later, and the bidders went into a tailspin. The collapse nearly bankrupted not only British Telecom owing to the enormous debt it incurred for the bids, but the entire industry worldwide. The economic slump that followed made it impossible for firms to pay off high debts, as their interest payments increased while their ratings fell.

A contrarian move in France is noteworthy for its prescience and insight. CEO Martin Bouygues (pronounced “Bweeg”) of the third mobile operator, Bouygues Telecom, refused the government’s demand of $4.5 billion as the fee for a 3G licence, making it the only mobile communications company in Europe with no investment in 3G. Mr Bouygues’ letter in May 2000 appeared on the front page of Le Monde, asking: “What should I tell my employees? … That we have a choice between a sudden death and a slow one?” While his opposition was ignored, by 2002, the French government dropped its asking price by more than 85 per cent to induce Bouygues to accept a 3G licence.

In terms of results, the auction “failures” – the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, and “non-auction” countries like South Korea, Japan and Finland (until 2009) – have the best broadband services.2

Kapil Sibal’s appointment as India’s telecom minister has brought hope, with prospects of radical improvements in infrastructure, especially broadband, with a clean hand. Mr Sibal’s recent pronouncements on a new telecom policy, however, raise the spectre of another deadlock. Here are two examples: (a) “Adequate spectrum will be provided to all service providers.”

This is feasible not through slivers of spectrum for many operators, but only if there is a common carrier access, that is, all operators can access spectrum for a reasonable fee. There is no indication of what “adequate” means, nor of pooling or sharing spectrum.

Let’s hope the domain experts have been heard and not shouted down on “adequacy”. For instance, the Telecom Equipment Manufacturers’ Association had recommended that two blocks of 50 MHz each in the 698-806 MHz band be allocated to facilitate the development of wireless equipment and services. Large blocks of contiguous spectrum offer far more efficient capacity than many narrow bands. For local innovation, to get low costs, we have to think of adequacy in these terms, and not slivers of 4.4 MHz or 6.2 MHz.

(b) “Spectrum henceforth will be awarded only on a market-based mechanism.”

If the criterion for success is high bids and not delivered services, in effect, this means auctions, and the result is likely to be dismal. Those enamoured with auctions focus on the success of bids, ignoring the purpose of spectrum/licence allocation, which is service delivery resulting in consumer surplus (societal benefits).

If the operators choose to roll over and accept authoritarian decrees, a deadlock may develop again as it did in 1998 between the government and the public interest.

The government’s choices include:

  • a genuine effort at developing comprehensive and integrated policies for reasonably priced services, while carrying along stakeholders;
  • a cosmetic effort, letting stakeholders vent, and then issuing arbitrary decrees that leave a mess. For example, too many operators with fragmented spectrum; or
  • attempting a political or populist fix, seeking to make the United Progressive Alliance look good, the Opposition look bad, bleeding all operators to avoid accusations of a sell-out, and still leave a mess.

The first alternative is in the public interest; the second and third are not. The issues that need comprehensive transformation are spectrum and network sharing for service delivery at least cost. The government and Mr Sibal have the opportunity to choose an approach resulting in excellent delivery including broadband at reasonable prices.



1 'Spectrum Auctions Hurt Mobile Consumers', Bengt Nordstrom, Businessweek, August 17, 2010: http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/aug2010/gb20100817_915227.htm

2 'Broadband quality ranking - by economic development', Pierre Verdi, October 27, 2010:

http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/newsandevents/releases/PublishingImages/3%20-%20Broadband%20quality%20ranking%20-%20by%20economic%20development.jpg