Cashlessness Needs Connectivity

... And connectivity needs political and administrative convergence.

Shyam Ponappa    |   January 5, 2017

This new year brings with it uncertainties amidst the push for cashlessness. Without going into the demerits or otherwise, some clarity on a road map to go forward from where we are might help with realistic planning to manage our way out of this situation.

Cashless transactions need ubiquitous connectivity, which we don’t have.  Without it, the goal is simply unfeasible. Better to recognise this now, rather than act out elaborate charades, resulting in avoidable economic hardship and social ructions.  Connectivity needs effective, efficient communication links at a reasonable cost. These call for realistic objectives and solid implementation, not bluster and unrealistic goals or plans, such as fibre-optic networks everywhere, payment systems on a hastily assembled database riddled with imposters, or insufficient security and privacy.

What’s required?

 

The need is for internet connectivity using fibre backbones, extending to users through aggregation networks that are mostly wireless. The chances of establishing these networks increase if political parties and government agencies take concerted action on how to do so. This is necessary for two reasons. One is that our present network development and spectrum policies do not facilitate achieving universal broadband, especially in areas with lower commercial potential than prosperous urban clusters. The second is the legacy of network development with entrenched rivalries and perceived ways of managing spectrum, and the aftermath of the spectrum scam.  These constrain society’s collective ability to configure solutions for connectivity, as opposed to the biased or limited perceptions of stakeholder groups such as the government, the judiciary, the citizenry, and industry (comprising service providers and equipment suppliers). Government agencies also have divergent agenda, e.g., the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Trai) is responsible for recommending spectrum use, the Department of Telecommunications/Ministry of Communications has licensing authority and runs the state-owned operators, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting holds certain spectrum bands, the Ministry of Defence and government agencies hold other bands, and the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology is responsible (without the authority) for providing broadband. Hence, the need for a convergent approach, as effected partially for electricity supply, from coal mining through transportation to distribution (although other sectors – hydel, hydrocarbons and nuclear – are yet to be similarly linked).

What needs doing
 

Radical changes such as pooling and sharing network infrastructure have to be considered for widespread connectivity. Such changes can’t happen with confrontation and mistrust, but only with trust and cooperation. This may seem naïve, but the ruling party leadership sets the tone for cooperation, as does the administrative leadership. Their pitch has to be sufficiently persuasive to induce diverse stakeholders – other political leaders, the judiciary, the citizenry who want industry to pay their pound of flesh while getting good services that are priced very low, and the operators, who have huge investments in networks and spectrum rights – to consider sharing equipment, and to work out worthwhile terms for everyone. 

Currently, contending political parties pursuing selfish objectives as antagonists settle at the lowest achievable equilibrium. To understand why, consider two parties, A and B, with objectives along the horizontal X axis for A and the vertical Y axis for B in the chart. 

When parties pursue conflicting interests confrontationally, they end up at N or Nash Equilibrium, where neither can improve their position without the other’s concurrence.  Assume A has the objective of maximising a majoritarian agenda, while B seeks to maximise dynastic control of its leadership positions. This holds for any objectives that are unrelated (orthogonal). If their objectives are along the same dimension — say, control of the Centre or of the same states, there can be no accommodation: one wins what the other loses. This has happened so far, as parties are periodically voted in and then out by a disenchanted electorate. But if they accommodate, their equilibrium could move up to S, the “Best Feasible Equilibrium” point, where the acceptable limits of their respective objectives meet. (For more details, see: “Tata’s Corus Buy: A Game Theory Analysis”, organizing-india.blogspot.in, November 2, 2006, and "India’s Access To Nuclear Fuel & Technology", April 3, ) 

2008.)

Imagine waking up to find that instead of the usual confrontation and vitriol, a different and gracious protocol awaits you. One of harmonious interaction marked by accommodation and courtesy, despite nature being red in tooth and claw. Utopian?  Perhaps. But not if the powers that be realise that the way out of the cashless crisis is to seek benefits for everyone, instead of self-destructing by chasing chimera such as pure cashlessness or other unrealistic goals.  Instead, they could give people what they need but don’t have: ubiquitous communications  infrastructure that facilitates all activities (not just cashless transactions), and a more secure, well-ordered environment for pursuing their livelihoods and well-being. Policy decisions to share network infrastructure would be the start of this journey.

We can then break out of the impasse created by legacy communications policies and posturing, e.g., which party was responsible for what scam, the popular obsession with high auction prices for spectrum while wanting cheaper services, and operators committed to cornering spectrum.

Once the leadership collaborates, they’ll find that communications services delivery will be much improved by sharing capacity and coordination. This would enable other stakeholders – private sector operators, the citizenry, the judiciary – to accept that everyone gains from cooperative access to and delivery of communications services, provided adequate profits are generated and shared equitably. This will help in accepting a more rational, pay-for-use policy on the lines of highways, metro rail, or oil pipeline usage, and recognise the financial infeasibility of having auctions as well as funds for investments in networks for countrywide broadband access.

Government and stakeholders can then work together to develop solutions that are fair and practical. For instance, one or more consortium/s of operators with the government as a co-investor in each (on the lines of Singapore’s OpenNet) can co-own the network and coordinate for most effective and efficient service delivery.  Earnings from spectrum usage can be collected by the government once the networks are commercially viable, as for developing any other infrastructure. Such collections are likely to exceed the auction fees foregone, as with revenue sharing from licence fees.

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                                                               Shyam Ponappa at gmail dot com

Super WiFi & Shared Spectrum

A Time to Start Sharing Look into sharing spectrum and 'Super Wi-Fi', instead of auctions, refarming and exclusive allocation.

Shyam Ponappa / Nov 01, 2012

Amidst our preoccupation with internal problems of misgovernance, we’re losing track of long-term technical developments elsewhere.  For instance, there’s a buzz about “Super Wi-Fi” technology in other countries that's missing in India. Yet this could make spectrum abundant, while avoiding the problems of private allocation.  Here’s why India with its floundering, beleaguered telecommunications sector should stay abreast.

Super Wi-Fi using TVWS

The technology for unused TV spectrum bands, or TV White Spaces (TVWS), is referred to as “Super Wi-Fi”, although it doesn’t conform to earlier Wi-Fi standards, nor does it use the 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz licence-exempt spectrum. Super Wi-Fi has its own standards (IEEE 802.22, and 802.11 af in draft form) using 470-810 MHz, the “digital dividend” after conversion from analogue broadcast TV. It can be used for long-range rural broadband, and to improve short-range coverage. In the US, where it was pioneered, access is available without a licence to devices registered with a proximate geolocational database. Like regular Wi-Fi, Super Wi-Fi expands the use of available spectrum by sharing access.

The US is also permitting exploration of shared use in defence and security bands from 1755-1850 MHz, extending the potential for sharing spectrum.1

TVWS trials

Earlier this month, Singapore’s Infocomm Development Authority organised a workshop on TVWS with government and private entities. Organisers included the Institute for Infocomm Research (I²R) and other local participants, with presentations from companies from the US, Europe, Asia, and Africa, including Microsoft, Google, Spectrum Bridge, Adaptrum, Ericsson subsidiary Telcordia, Neul, Japan’s NCIT, and so on.2 Completed or ongoing trials are shown in the diagram below.

Super WiFi Trials

Source: http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=29678

TVWS and shared spectrum vs refarming

These developments should be of vital interest in India to policy makers, operators and users — not only for TVWS as a shared resource, but as an approach that could be extended to other bands, so that limited spectrum availability doesn’t constrain reasonably priced, high-speed data services. This is a serious limitation in India, unlike in other countries where a few operators have sufficient spectrum; in this sense, the need to share spectrum is much greater in India. For example, sharing could provide a better alternative to refarming of the 900 MHz band, allowing for both 4G and legacy uses.

One difficulty is that dominant operators may oppose sharing because their spectrum holdings provide a competitive advantage: possibly Bharti, Reliance, or an aspirant like Vodafone with access to inexpensive offshore funding. Our collective interests here, however, are likely to be best served not by constraining access through limited, exclusive spectrum, but by making spectrum abundant through sharing, allowing for wide bands (2x20 MHz or 2x40 MHz) that can be aggregated for much higher throughput for data, not just for voice.

For this to happen, (a) the government has to explore spectrum sharing in TVWS as well as in other bands, and (b) stakeholders must be receptive, to co-operate effectively on a workable plan on the lines of revenue sharing after NTP-99, extending to broadband delivery. Everyone will gain: users will get better access, operators can thrive, and the government will collect much more revenue over time. However, dominant operators will need to give up their spectrum for the greater common interest including their own, and for this, they will need compensation — as in production-sharing agreements in the oil sector.

The advantages of spectrum sharing

There are a number of advantages of sharing spectrum. First, and important, it can be non-discriminatory. Second, it avoids private allocation; shared spectrum can be accessed without allocation to private parties. Then there is the fact that capital cost is reduced. There is no deadweight loss from capital tied up in auctions, freeing it all for network development and service delivery. Finally, there’s the general misinformation about auctions, which become academic if spectrum is shared. If spectrum is instead auctioned, the public interest – of users, operators and producers – will be adversely affected. (On producers, while local manufacturing is currently insignificant, there is considerable scope if it is set up right, as telecommunications equipment imports are expected to exceed energy imports in a few years.)

The Supreme Court was misinformed about auction fees exceeding revenue-sharing collections, and not informed of its detriments. As evidenced after NTP-99, networks and services proliferated, resulting in much higher collections than auction fees foregone. The Supreme Court’s opinion on the Presidential Reference clarified that auctions were not mandatory for other resources, but not for spectrum, although the reasoning is the same. This needs rectification if spectrum is not shared, because revenue-share collections and tax revenues on profits from more extensive networks and services are likely to far exceed the estimated auction fees of Rs 40,000 crore over three years, quite apart from the major public benefits of access.

Space for constructive decisions

Another requirement for constructive resolution is that policy makers be given the requisite space to frame solutions that are genuinely in the public interest. These solutions can be premised on abundance if it is possible, rather than artificial scarcity and rationing. At present, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, the Department of Telecommunications, and other authorities including the Empowered Group of Ministers are under immense pressure to favour aggressive government collections, instead of what might be genuinely beneficial. This is an odd consequence of the government’s increasing loss of credibility, resulting in the rise of populists, “profit haters”, and ignorant-yet-opinionated sceptics. Uninformed attacks on constructive approaches and alternatives need to be presented and seen in a more balanced way by an informed media, press and public, instead of being fuelled by indiscriminate hype.

Also, we have to learn to distinguish between problems of ideological conviction – those that can be solved through political accommodation – and engineering problems, like network design and service delivery at least cost. Resorting to political accommodation for engineering requirements results in malfunction and/or collapse.

A good way to proceed is to ensure sharing solutions are worked out without incurring exorbitant cost — not only for TVWS but also for legacy operations, such as in the 900 MHz band. These can induce new network build-outs for data services in urban as well as underserved rural areas, and broadband service delivery across the country.

shyamponappa at gmail dot com 


1: Other bands being considered for sharing in the US are:
1695-1710 MHz & 3550-3650 MHz; Unlicensed: 5350-5470 MHz & 5850-5925 MHz.  For details, see: http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-57529959-94/defense-department-pushes-spectrum-sharing-as-solution-to-wireless-crunch/

2: http://whitespace.i2r.a-star.edu.sg/TVWS_Workshop/Programme.html

Details on the UK (Cambridge) trials at: http://www.cambridgewireless.co.uk/docs/Cambridge White Spaces Trial - technical findings-with higher res pics.pdf

Catching Up On Broadband

The govt can invest some of the Rs 1,00,000 crore from the spectrum auctions to help India catch up on broadband

Shyam Ponappa /  July 1, 2010

When it comes to broadband, India is “notably lagging its peers”, to quote Booz & Co, an international consulting firm.* Its report recounts our pathetic coverage — less than half the anticipated 20 million — and recommends that both industry and government must act in concert. Spelling out the roles for both, it concludes that we need a national policy to improve fixed-line infrastructure more rapidly than the current market-based approach does, as well as satellite-based communications.

The report recommends this because advanced economies have broadband on widespread fixed-line networks, and many are pursuing strategies to further empower their citizens through state action, as before. The effects are many, but let’s start with examining costs.  Figure 1 shows the relative cost of broadband in a sample of countries.

Figure 1: Broadband Cost PPP US $

India seems favourably placed with its low purchasing power parity (PPP) cost. However, relative to costs in India, this is about 6 per cent of average monthly gross national income (GNI) per capita, ranked 78th, as shown in Figure 2.  In comparison, the first 23 countries — Macao, Israel, Hong Kong, the US, Singapore, etc., Greece and Spain included — have costs below or close to 1 per cent; the next 16 have costs below 2 per cent. As the 39 countries have PPP costs of only 0.25 per cent to twice India’s cost, India’s cost as a percentage of its GNI is six times theirs, i.e. Indian users have to pay relatively more. Increasing GNI, while desirable, is harder, more complex, and will take much longer. By contrast, costs can be reduced quickly by sharing network resources and limiting government collections to a reasonable percentage of revenues, instead of auctions and arbitrary levies.

Figure 2: Fixed Broadband Cost As % GNI Per Capita 

Source: http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/publications/idi/2010/Material/MIS_2010_without%20annex%204-e.pdf

Broadband leaders

Wired Asian countries like Japan, Hong Kong and South Korea already offer broadband on the next generation of high-speed networks. Singapore’s approach especially should be of interest to India, with policies supporting a blend of public subsidies and private investment, while separating three activities: infrastructure, network operations (wholesale), and user services (retail)**

Two years ago, Singapore set out to create an environment with more open access to downstream operators by separating the building of infrastructure from the running of the network. It drew on the experience of local community networks in countries like Britain, France, the Netherlands and Sweden. Three Singapore companies partnered with Axia Netmedia, a Canadian broadband company, to form a consortium called OpenNet, the infrastructure operator. OpenNet uses one partner’s existing network (SingTel’s) as a base. With a government grant of 750 million Singapore dollars, OpenNet is building an extensive fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) grid to be completed by 2012. The second partner is a subsidiary of Singapore Power, SP Telecommunications, which leverages Singapore Power’s experience in developing infrastructure. The third, Singapore Press Holdings, is a leading media services company.

The network operator, a subsidiary of StarHub (a cable and phone operator), is Nucleus Connect. Residential services at 100 mbps have been announced, to be provided by over 10 retail service operators. While some analysts opine that increased competition may not lead to appreciable cost reduction, Singapore is already ranked fifth-lowest in cost as a percentage of average monthly GNI per capita.

Can India do some catching up?

a) Can India do something similar? Don’t we need to? How?

The answer to the first question is: only if the government decides on a concerted drive.

To the second: yes, to be competitive.

To the third: with a comprehensive, integrated systems approach. It is insufficient if only one or a few ministries and agencies are involved, because the development and execution of solutions require cutting across turf boundaries. The conventional approach of the ongoing Trai consultation followed by recommendations addressed by the DoT is simply inadequate, because their charter is too limited. Many issues concerning commercial and user decisions, particularly of government agencies and the Department of Defence, and radical changes in approach need active participation from these players as well as the private sector for resolution. Examples are Booz & Co’s recommendations of a better fixed-wire network, and satellite communications in the Ka band, or the possibility of exploiting the cable and satellite TV network of around 110 million households. The entire communications network, or at least the backbone, needs to be shared for efficiency, unlike the existing limited tower-sharing. Also, state governments need to be closely involved in issues like Rights of Way and user needs.

b) Governments at the Centre and all states need to facilitate the productivity of their citizens, instead of hamstringing them with taxes, levies, auctions and dysfunctional policies. This is more easily said than done, with our predatory history, fractious coalitions at the Centre and states, and freewheeling, combative state governments. Governments at all levels have to coordinate this problem-solving initiative for all stakeholders, adapting the experience of leading broadband countries, instead of predatory behaviour seeking personal gains. The consultative process needs to agree on goals, and then figure out practical ways to achieve them.

c) With inspired leadership and a constructive approach, half of the over Rs 1,00,000 crore from the 3G and BWA auctions could support a broadband gambit drawing on concepts like Singapore’s public-private partnership, instead of being just a damaging revenue-collection exercise. Again, easier said than done, but with result-oriented, strong leadership to elicit enlightened employee engagement, even MTNL and BSNL could be partners in a core network in a role like SingTel’s. A public-private network-builder can draw on the combined strengths of its participants to provide a platform for a number of private operators. Separating the infrastructure building and operations from wholesale network services and end-user services could make this feasible and practicable.

shyamponappa@gmail.com

* “Bringing mass broadband to India: Roles for government and industry”, Booz & Co, June 7, 2010: http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/Bringing_Mass_Boadband_To_India.pdf

** “Singapore gets wired for speed”, Sonia Kolesnikov-Jessop, NYT: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/technology/15iht-rtechbroad.html?ref=internet

India's Sorry Spectrum Story

How not to do ICT for development

Shyam Ponappa /  June 3, 2010

The network of roads is mostly public property. What if the government decided to make more money from our use of this property? Made users pay for these public assets, whether the roads are there, or yet to be built? Demanded up-front fees for a fixed-term right, followed by annual fees marked-to-market to reflect “fair market value”...

All roads would be expensive, and few people would be able to afford their use. Imagine what it would do to plans to build new roads. Imagine how much you would have to pay for road use, how usage would drop, the sheer inconvenience, and the impediments to productivity.

This is not happening to the majority of our roads, but it is to communications, especially broadband. With some differences, this is what spectrum fees are about. The major difference is that spectrum fees are levied on operators, not end users (the equivalent for roads would be fees from government agencies/road operators).

For instance, Bharti and Vodafone paid Rs 12,300 crore and Rs 11,600 crore respectively up front for 3G spectrum. This is one reason why India won’t get widespread broadband networks in a hurry, nor reasonably priced services. The investment in spectrum fees and networks is so high that operators will probably offer limited, high-margin products. They will focus on high-traffic routes and ignore the rest, serving 50-100 million, instead of a billion: exactly the opposite of what we need.

The spectrum story

This approach to spectrum management is an object lesson in how not to use information and communications technology (ICT) for development. Each operator is assigned a sliver of spectrum exclusively . The resulting “scarce spectrum” predicament demonstrates why this approach is entirely unsuitable for optimising net benefits. Optimisation requires making trade-offs between technology, economics and commercial interests for development and the common good.

The situation is aggravated by three additional factors:

• Too many operators in a franchise area (12-16 in India, as against an international average of three to five), resulting in limited capacity and high capital costs.
  
  
• Limited availability of spectrum for commercial use, because of the extent assigned to the government, defence and the public sector.
  
  
• The government’s periodic efforts to extract as much revenue as possible from spectrum: an exploitative approach, instead of nurturing capacity to generate fair tax returns over the long term. Even in advanced economies, high auction bids have been disastrous.

Consequences 

• The average spectrum available per user is of the order of 5.5 MHz in India, compared to an international average of about 22 MHz.

Delhi and Mumbai have cell sites that are less than 100 metres apart, compared with around 200 metres in Istanbul, 300 metres in Munich, and 350 metres in Berlin. Decreased inter-cell distances increase interference, thus restricting capacity. If each operator has more spectrum, traffic-handling capacity increases at a lower cost. Improving technical efficiency at the cost of economic efficiency loses out on capacity at low cost. Cellular operators in India are forced to extract greater spectrum efficiency (see Figure 1), which sounds good until you factor in the increased costs and opportunity losses.

Figure 1: Spectrum Efficiency in Delhi & Mumbai compared with London, Singapore & Hong Kong

Source: 'An assessment of spectrum management policy in India', Plum Consulting, December 2008: David Lewin, Val Jervis, Chris Davis, Ken Pearson.

http://www.plumconsulting.co.uk/pdfs/GSMA%20spectrum%20management%20policy%20in%20India.pdf

The report from which Figure 1 is taken estimates that spectrum assignments increased to international norms would have lowered industry costs by 21 per cent (Rs 11,700 crore or $2.6 billion in 2008). This would have resulted in more extensive coverage at less cost, with greater consumer welfare.

• The result is high-cost infrastructure for operators as well as for users. Too many operators make for increased capital costs for each operator, and cumulatively for all operators — unless they use common networks. Higher efficiency requires more base stations and more advanced technology, both adding to costs. Despite this, operators are exhorted to improve their spectrum efficiency. After a detailed assessment, the report concludes:

" • The claims regarding the scale of the capacity increases possible with the use of various techniques are significantly overstated.

• In the case of adaptive multi-rate (AMR) codecs, this technique is already being deployed on a widespread basis.

• The claims wrongly assume that the capacity gains from the different techniques are additive. This is simply not true in a number of cases. For example, the gain achievable with DFCA is less if AMR has already been implemented.

• There are substantial costs associated with deploying advanced techniques — both for operators in terms of network upgrades and for end users in terms of new handsets.

• It is important to be aware that deployment of some of the techniques, such as AMR HR, leads to lower quality of service.

• The focus on spectrum optimisation techniques for 2G networks fails to take into account the fact that the efforts of the suppliers have now shifted from 2G optimisation to 3G deployment.

Those making these claims seek more intensive deployment of advanced techniques to maximise technical spectrum efficiency. But a better policy objective, as we argue (in a later section), is overall economic efficiency. From this perspective, it only makes sense to deploy advanced technologies when this is a lower cost way of increasing capacity than adding further base stations. Indeed it is against the interest of the Indian economy to deploy them if this is not the case."

The approach is counterproductive and against our interests. Advanced economies are doing the opposite, encouraging investment in broadband to improve productivity, while India’s policies actually constrain productivity.

• A third consequence is the non-availability of spectrum in the more efficient bands, eg, 700-900 MHz. This has a negative effect on last-mile roll-out and services in rural areas. Lack of coverage in the hinterland is a severe deficiency in areas that are poorly served by fixed-line networks. It only perpetuates the vicious circle of low potential in rural areas with deficient broadband and Internet access.

The curse of spectrum auctions

Two recent developments have created additional burdens. One is the 3G auction, with bids of over Rs 67,000 crore (almost $15 billion). Another is the TRAI (Telecom Regulatory Authority of India) recommendation that 2G operators with over 6.2 MHz must pay for additional spectrum at prices determined by the 3G auction, resulting in a precipitous fall in the shares of major operators (ee Figure 2).

Figure 2: Telecom Stocks After TRAI's Fees Recommended For 2G 

Why should governments be concerned when stock prices fall? For the same reasons they should want stable markets: investment and prosperity, leading to public welfare. It makes little sense to entice investment into high-potential, sunrise sectors, only to batter successful enterprises with arbitrary “taxes”. Bharti described the changes as “shocking, arbitrary and retrograde”; Vodafone called them “opaque, illogical and discriminatory”.

Like an absurd play, events have taken a surreal turn, with the Department of Telecommunications reportedly demanding spectrum fees from the Defence Department. However, no additional demands were made on companies cashing in on assigned spectrum rights that sold for windfall gains without any networks or users. This seems equally absurd.

The government needs to give up making short-term revenue killings, and instead, maximise net welfare through building productive capacity. Ubiquitous broadband is good for productivity and for the environment. As for auctions, remember that collections from revenue sharing after the New Telecom Policy 1999 (NTP ’99) far exceed the bids. Let us have the wisdom to collect those golden eggs over time, instead of eating the goose now.

                                                                       shyamponappa@gmail.com

Organizing Ourselves: Cautionary Tales & Inspiring Possibilities

Shyam Ponappa / New Delhi October 04, 2007

Instances and inspiring possibilities of institution building.


Some time ago, a perceptive ‘re-reading’ of the Babur Nama by Sunil Sethi in these pages highlighted the similarity of India’s problems and needs in the 16th century and now: essentially, the lack of purposive organisation and infrastructure.* Having failed for five centuries barring exceptions, should we then give up on organising ourselves? Or can we possibly make the effort to learn from those of our institutions and others that work as purposive systems - achievement-oriented organisations — to try to effect a transformation, to define a pragmatic way forward? Collaboration in the common interest instead of following our penchant for argumentation, and indulging in a million mutinies. Especially for self-aggrandisement in the ultra short run (because in the long run, it is in everyone’s interests to co-operate).

Some of our institutions that work, by and large:

- The defence services: the Navy, Air Force, and Army.

- Companies serving external markets: our IT stars were early champions, now under a cloud until they reinvent themselves. Broadly, knowledge-based companies, and some engineering and textile companies.

- The Delhi Metro, Konkan Railways, some aspects of Indian Railways.

- Some areas of government.

- Some groups of professionals.


For most of the rest of us, while there are very many excellent individuals, alas, few are part of any organised system.

The Challenge

It is really up to us whether to go on in this chaotic, neo-feudal way with the specious excuse of being the largest democracy, or to buckle down to organising and functioning in our collective better interests.

The greatest impediment is our unwillingness to act in concert while carrying the baggage of sectarian inclinations, a sort of tribalism focused on the special interests of factions, the lesser loyalties of region, caste, clan, family. Our needs are exactly the opposite: aggregation of information, allowing cross-discipline analysis for problem definition — informed, correct diagnosis — and the synthesis of solutions that are workable, that can be and are executed on the ground, i.e. the organisation and prioritised management of initiatives — prime areas for nonpartisan, multidisciplinary thinking and action. The questions are whether and how issues of common interest can elicit coherent behaviour.

Opportunities For Covergent Action?

Are there compelling purposes that could help us break out of this rut? Persuade us to act more responsibly, be less mindful only of our rights while being oblivious of our coequal obligations.

Could the purpose of deploying India’s currency reserves profitably for everyone’s benefit enthuse us — especially our politicians — to start thinking and acting collaboratively? The incentive could be Rs 90,000 crore a year from $150 billion invested.

Or of organising waste collection and disposal, so we can live in better surroundings some years down? From waste collection through effective, humane systems, including organising and paying rag pickers, to managing sustainable disposal, removing this great blight.

These are the issues that deserve nonpartisan attention, where a sense of our obligations would help. Such issues need breakthroughs of nonpartisan, convergent action in the common interest, with “right knowledge” (expert inputs), not merely negotiation and/or accommodation of public opinion. Everything is not best left to public opinion. We need to distinguish between issues for public debate, and those that need resolution with expertise or competence. This is impossible without abjuring sectarian interests and populism. If we go with public opinion, we will opt for “free” power and water, and stay mired in shortages and with dreadful sanitation … Few major projects — hydroelectric projects, nuclear plants, or dredging projects — will come about.

Given the realities of the evolution of Indian politics, ultimately, these initiatives probably need to be structured to tie into a fair election funding process. Either that, or the tax and PDS systems must become good enough to channel excess receipts into a decent election funding system, which will need to be developed. Without such incentives and processes, it is unlikely that our predatory politics and heedless public behaviour will change, or that we can break out of our established interest groups.


The Risks of Business-As-Usual

Many seem to expect that because India is in the early stages of its political and economic development, things will improve with education and prosperity. For these sanguine business-as-usual-ists, there are two cautionary images. One is the highly evolved democratic processes mired in a hardliners’ deadlock, the predicament of America. The second is the unresolved, divergent paths taken by the French-speaking Walloons and the Flemish in Belgium. These educated, prosperous people have stayed apart, and not been able to get beyond their uncooperative mindsets to function as a nation.

Lessons Abound

There is also much to learn from other countries if we care to, although we tend to dismiss others’ experiences as irrelevant. Small nations especially, like Belgium, Dubai or Singapore, are often viewed simplistically. It is in our interest, however, to look to wherever we need to for our purposes. Take Singapore: a closer look reveals the complexity it has had to overcome and the distance it has travelled to achieve its position. Set adrift in 1965 with a hodge podge of migrants from southern China, southern India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and the archipelago, it had no homogeneous population, common language or culture. But it had plenty of examples of troubled and failing states as warnings. As venerable Singaporean leader Lee Kwan Yew puts it, “… we knew what to avoid — racial conflict, linguistic strife, religious conflict. We saw Ceylon …” Singapore’s secret is its practice of an unsentimental pragmatism that is “ideology free”.**

Many in India dismiss Singapore as a model because of its scale. But scale hasn’t stopped China from taking lessons. China’s officials have been interacting regularly and systematically with Singaporean counterparts, as they have with other countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands. Chinese ministers have meetings twice a year with Singaporean ministers to learn from them; every three months, fifty mayors of Chinese cities visit for courses in city management. Likewise, China is learning waste management from Flanders, as are Russia and Britain.

Our institutions must, of course, be tailored to our context. As a UN University report notes, successful institutional changes typically emerge as a mixture of country-specific innovation and chance developments, as well as deliberate learning.*** All we need do is select pivotal issues to galvanize nonpartisan thinking and collective action.


shyamponappa@gmail.com

* “On re-reading Babur Nama in 2007”, BS August 11, 2007: http://www.business-standard.com/search/storypage_new.php?leftnm=4&leftindx=4&subLeft=1&autono=294099

** “Lee Kuan Yew, founder of Singapore, changing with times”, Seth Mydans & Wayne Arnold, International Herald Tribune: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/29/world/asia/29iht-lee-excerpts.html

*** “Stranger than Fiction? Understanding Institutional Changes and Economic Development”, Ha-Joon Chang, UN University Policy Brief No. 6, 2007: http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/policy-brief/pb06-07.pdf